Updating boss md2
Generally describes strong (unbreakable) encryption. Within the United States, law enforcement is constantly lobbying to restrict the use of strong encryption. export restrictions (and desire to spy on foreigners) was one of the reasons France relaxed its own law-enforcement bans on encryption use by citizens.
At that time, the hacker attacks the systems with the new exploit.
Key point: The term "0-day" describes any bit of information in the community, whether it is serial numbers, lists of proxies, or passwords to porn sites. export restrictions can easily be easily be bypassed, allowing many foreigners access to products with 128-bit encryption (example: https://de).
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[ $IFS | 'bot | .forward | | /dev/null | /dev/random | /etc | /etc/hosts | /etc/hosts.equiv | /etc/| /etc/passwd | /etc/services | /etc/shadow | 0-day | 11 | 128-bit | 2600 | 3DES | 3DES_EDE | 40-bit | 56-bit | 64-bit | 8 | 8-character password | 802.11 | 802.1q | ~user ] The term 0-day exploit describes an exploit that is not publicly known.
Contrast: The term 0-day exploit describe the hard-to-use exploits by the discoverer himself (or close friends), in contrast to the easy-to-use scripts employed by script kiddies.
For example, a buffer-overflow script will go through many phases as people try to find the right offsets for the target platforms, but will eventually end up as a broad-spectrum aim-and-shoot script that anybody could use.
It describe tools by elite hackers who have discovered a new bug and shared it only with close friends.
It also describes some new exploit for compromising popular services (the usual suspects: BIND, FTP services, Linux distros, Microsoft IIS, Solaris servers).
Key point: One of the dangers of 0-day exploits is BUGTRAQ camping.
A hacker discovers all the services running on the target victim and waits for day-0 when the exploit is announced.
As soon as such information becomes well-known and exploited by large numbers of people, it is then fixed by the victim. The United States only allows export of the weaker version in order to allow the government to spy on foreigners, especially during times of war (Author's note: my grandfather worked with the code-breakers in WWII -- it had a major impact indeed on winning the war). Likewise, it has stifled development within the United States of products that need encryption, such as IEEE 802.11 wireless Ethernet.
Information has a "half-life": the older it is, the less value it has. Key point: The debate over strong encryption is never ending.